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Abstract
We present evidence on Fear of Floating (FF) practices before and after the adoption of
Inﬂation Targeting (IT) for three emerging countries that faced important exchange rate
crises in the 1990’s (Brazil, Mexico and South Korea). We start using the methodologies
proposed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Ball and Reyes (2008), and check the
probabilities of observing small monthly exchange rate changes, combined with large
movements in policy instruments (international reserves and interest rates), which should
indicate some degree of exchange rate targeting. This initial exercise suggests a progress
towards greater exchange rate ﬂexibility after IT. We then use a VAR model to analyse
the monetary policy response to exchange rate and inﬂation shocks, and detect a drastic
reduction in direct intervention in the foreign exchange market after IT, accompanied by
a stronger response to inﬂation. These ﬁndings are consistent with the IT framework, and
suggest a reduced role for FF.
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Resumo
O artigo apresenta evidˆ encia sobre “medo de ﬂutuar” (Fear of Floating) antes e depois
da ado¸ c˜ ao do regime de metas para a inﬂa¸ c˜ ao em trˆ es economias emergentes que passaram
por fortes crises cambiais nos anos 1990 (Brasil, M´ exico e Cor´ eia do Sul). Inicialmente
as metodologias de Calvo and Reinhart (2002) e Ball and Reyes (2008) s˜ ao utilizadas,
checando a probabilidade de se observar pequenas varia¸ c˜ oes mensais na taxa de cˆ ambio,
combinadas com fortes movimentos nos intrumentos da pol´ ıtica monet´ aria (juros e reservas
internacionais), o que seria um indicativo de “medo de ﬂutuar”. Esse primeiro exerc´ ıcio
indica uma mudan¸ ca em favor de maior liberdade cambial ap´ os a ado¸ c˜ ao do regime
de metas. Em seguida, um modelo VAR ´ e usado para se analisar a rea¸ c˜ ao da pol´ ıtica
monet´ aria a choques na inﬂa¸ c˜ ao e no cˆ ambio, e uma dr´ astica redu¸ c˜ ao na interven¸ c˜ ao no
mercado de cˆ ambio ´ e detectada, acompanhada por maior resposta a choques inﬂacion´ arios.
Esses resultados s˜ ao consistentes com a teoria sobre regime de metas para a inﬂa¸ c˜ ao.
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1. Introduction
Most of the emerging countries that adopted an explicit inﬂation targeting (IT
hereafter) regime had previously pegged their nominal exchange rate to a stable
low-inﬂation currency as means to achieving price stability during the 1990’s.
However, the recent experience has shown that in a world with high capital mobility,
conventional pegged exchange rates are rather fragile (see Fischer (2001) and Calvo
and Mishkin (2003)). In this sense, the adoption of IT by those countries can be
better viewed as a response to the breakdown of their pegged exchange rate systems,
than as a planned policy shift. Therefore, there is great debate regarding the true
commitment of emerging countries to IT and ﬂoating exchange rates, which, as
pointed-out by Ag´ enor (2002), leads to lower levels of monetary policy credibility.
In this paper we look at three emerging countries that adopted IT after
abandoning a pegged exchange rate system (Brazil, Mexico and South Korea).
We investigate whether the adoption of IT was accompanied by an actual shift
in monetary policy conduct from exchange rate targeting (a “Fear of Floating”
regime) 1 to IT (a “Fear of Inﬂation” regime). The main problem faced in this task
is one of identiﬁcation, as under both regimes it is natural for monetary policy to
respond to exchange rate shocks. In the exchange rate targeting regime the response
is obvious, but even in the IT regime there will still be incentives to respond if
exchange rate shocks are expected to pass-through into domestic inﬂation. 2 In fact,
some degree of exchange rate smoothing may be necessary under IT if movements
of the exchange rate may inﬂuence the Central Bank’s ability of attaining the
inﬂation targets (e.g. Eichengreen (2004); Ball and Reyes (2004); Mishkin (2004).
In this sense, an important aspect of this paper is that it investigates this issue both
before and after IT, which should help understanding the impact of this regime
switch on the monetary policy response to exchange rate shocks.
Initially, we apply the methodology proposed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and
further developed by Ball and Reyes (2008) to distinguish between “free-ﬂoaters”
from “dirty-ﬂoaters”. The approach basically consists in computing the probability
of observing monthly percent changes within a certain range for exchange rate
and policy instruments (international reserves and interest rates). The underlying
hypothesis is that under a pegged exchange rate regime, the variability of exchange
rates should be low, while the variability of policy instruments should be high, as
they are used to prevent the exchange rate from ﬂoating. For a ﬂexible regime, the
opposite results should hold. Unlike the original studies, we apply this methodology
not with the intention of classifying countries in terms of exchange rate regimes,
⋆ Submitted in April 2008, accepted in July 2009. I would like to thank Miguel Le´ on-Ledesma and two
anonymous referees for insightful comments and suggestions. Usual disclaimer applies.
E-mail address: reginaldo.nogueira@fjp.mg.gov.br.
1 See Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
2 Hausmann et al. (2001) have found a signiﬁcant relationship between exchange rate pass-through
and interventions in the foreign exchange market. They argue, however, that this relationship tends to
breakdown when they control for the ability of countries to borrow in their own currency.
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but yet to check whether the regime change has meant a movement towards greater
exchange rate ﬂexibility, as one would expect should these countries had truthfully
adopted IT.
After establishing if the exchange rate has been freer after IT, we focus with
more detail on the monetary policy response to exchange rate shocks. We apply a
VAR approach to check the responsiveness of the policy instruments to exchange
rate and inﬂation shocks. Our argument is that in the exchange rate targeting
regime one would expect that policy instruments show
(i) weak reaction to inﬂation shocks, and
(ii) a strong reaction to exchange rate shocks.
In contrast, in an IT regime one would expect
(i) a strong reaction to inﬂation shocks, and
(ii) a weak reaction to exchange rate shocks, conditional on a certain inﬂation
level.
In other words, monetary policy may be tightened under IT following a currency
depreciation, but not with the same magnitude that would be seen under an
exchange rate targeting regime.
We expect that the combined evidence from Calvo and Reinhart’s, Ball and
Reyes’s and the VAR approaches should give a clearer view on the degree
of commitment of the analysed countries with respect to IT and a ﬂoating
exchange rate. In fact, the results suggest that that the adoption of IT meant a
movement towards greater exchange rate ﬂexibility. Moreover, we show that direct
interventions in the exchange rate are milder after IT, and that the monetary policy
response to inﬂation shocks is stronger. Furthermore we observe that, in general,
exchange rate interventions by the Central Banks have moved away from a direct
stance, through the use of international reserves, to an indirect stance, using interest
rates. This suggests the use of interest rate rules common in IT regimes. Following
these ﬁndings we argue that interventions in the foreign exchange market should
not be necessarily seen as Fear of Floating but, potentially, as a required policy for
the attainment of the inﬂation targets.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 applies Calvo and Reinhart’s and
Ball and Reyes’s methodologies to test for exchange rate ﬂexibility against the
Fear of Floating hypothesis. Section 3 presents evidence on the monetary policy’s
response to inﬂation and exchange rate shocks within the VAR framework. Section
4 concludes.
2. Assessing Exchange Rate Flexibility
There are two basic instruments of exchange rate intervention: interest rates
and international reserves. The international reserves can be used to directly
intervene in the foreign exchange market, selling or buying foreign currency and
hence controlling the price of foreign currency in terms of the domestic one. The
interest rates can be used in an indirect manipulation, known in the literature as
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the “interest rate defence of the currency”. 3
Previous studies on Fear of Floating (FF hereafter) have compared the
variability of interest rates, exchange rate and international reserves for countries
that claim to follow a free-ﬂoating regime. The seminal contribution to this
literature was the methodology proposed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). They
presented their results in terms of the probability of observing monthly percent
changes within a certain range for nominal exchange rates, international reserves
and nominal interest rates. The ranges suggested are ± 2.5% changes in exchange
rates and international reserves, and 50 basis points change in interest rates. The
proposed test can be formalised as follows:
P[|△e| < x/peg] > P[|△e| < x/float] (1)
P[|△R| < x/peg] > P[|△R| < x/float] (2)
P[|△i| < y/peg] > P[|△i| < y/float] (3)
Where x is equal to 2.5%, y is equal to 50 basis points, △ e is the nominal
exchange rate change, △R is international reserves change, and △i is the change
in nominal interest rates.
The premise behind their analysis is that under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime the
variability of exchange rates should be low, while the variability of interest rates
and reserves should be high, as they are used to prevent the exchange rate from
ﬂoating. For a ﬂexible regime, the opposite results should hold.
Ball and Reyes (2008) suggested some modiﬁcations on Calvo and Reinhart’s
(2002) approach. Firstly, they criticized the use of nominal interest rates,
suggesting, instead, the use of real interest rates. They justiﬁed this change arguing
that the nominal interest rate moves broadly in step with inﬂation, so it is
important to break the link between the two variables before one can analyse
whether interest rates are responding to inﬂation or to exchange rate changes.
Secondly, they dropped the arbitrary ranges deﬁned by Calvo and Reinhart (2002)
and replaced it by standard deviations of each series, which they argued to be
more accommodative to studying country diﬀerences. 4 Finally, they advocated the
inclusion of an analysis of the variability of inﬂation, so as to check if the Central
Bank cares more about inﬂation or exchange rate stability. Their methodology can
be formalised as follows:
P[|△e| > sd/FF] < P[|△e| > sd/IT] (4)
P[|△P| > sd/FF] < P[|△P| > sd/IT] (5)
3 The term refers to the controversial policy stance of many emerging countries of raising interest rates
when the exchange rate is under pressure. For an overview, see Flood and Jeanne (2005).
4 Ball and Reyes (2008) argued that, for e.g., a developed country may ”fear” ﬂoating, but the interest
rates will rarely change by more than 50 basis points, whereas an emerging country, in a much more
volatile environment, may be a true ﬂoater but consider 50 basis points a small change in interest rates
to have the intended eﬀects on output and inﬂation. These diﬀerences may be important even within
the emerging countries group.
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P[|△R| > sd/FF] < P[|△R| > sd/IT] (6)
P[|△r| > sd/FF] < P[|△r| > sd/IT] (7)
Where sd is the standard deviation of each series, △r is the change in real interest
rates, △P is the change of the price index (the rate of inﬂation), FF stands for
Fear of Floating and IT for Inﬂation Targeting. The expected results from Ball
and Reyes’ (2008) approach is that under IT we should see more variability in
exchange rates and less in inﬂation and policy instruments than under FF. 5
In this paper we use both methodologies discussed above not to classify the
countries in terms of their exchange rate regimes, as in the original studies, but yet
to observe whether there was a movement towards greater exchange rate ﬂexibility
after the adoption of IT in Brazil, Mexico and South Korea. This is a relevant
question, since the literature on IT ranks exchange rate ﬂexibility as an essential
precondition for its adoption. In this sense, establishing if the exchange rate has
been freer to ﬂoat after IT is an important ﬁrst step in order to identify their true
commitment to this monetary policy framework.
2.1. Data
Data was obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database.
The inﬂation rate is the monthly rate of growth of the consumer price index. We
use nominal exchange rate movements, which are deﬁned as the monthly change of
the national currency per unit of dollar. A positive variation means depreciation,
and a negative variation means appreciation of the national currency. International
reserves data is the monthly change of foreign exchange reserves. The interest rate
used is the money market rate. The period of analysis corresponds to the interval
that spans from 1991M1 to 2005M12 for South Korea and Mexico 6 and 1995M1 to
2005M12 for Brazil. The analyses were made in two sub-periods: before and after
the regime change. For setting the sample breaks we have followed the oﬃcial date
of adoption of IT, as found in each Central Bank’s website. They are as follows:
1998M4 for South Korea; 1999M1 for Mexico; and 1999M6 for Brazil.
5 A drawback of both Calvo and Reinhart’s (2002) and Ball and Reyes’ (2008) approaches is that the
policy instruments may change even if the Central Bank has no intention to stabilize the exchange rate.
In turn, changes in policy instruments can aﬀect the exchange rate and generate some extra volatility.
To help dealing with these issues Ball and Reyes (2008) also suggested analysing the correlation between
policy instruments changes and inﬂation and exchange rate changes, in order to identify the Central
Bank’s intentions. In this paper we provide a more robust analysis of the monetary policy’s intentions,
through the estimation of VAR models.
6 Although Mexico has oﬃcially abandoned its pegged exchange rate in 1995M1, many authors have
shown that the exchange rate was still the main focus of monetary policy until the adoption of IT in
1999M1 (see, for e.g., Ball and Reyes (2004). In this sense we have opted to use a longer sample period
for this country, starting in 1991. Nevertheless, we have also applied our tests to Mexico with a sample
that spans from 1995M1 to 2005M12, and our results for the pre-IT sample were very similar. This
ﬁnding reinforces the argument that although Mexico has oﬃcially abandoned its peg in 1995M1, little
changed in actual policy before the formal introduction of IT.
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2.2. Results
The results from Calvo and Reinhart’s (2002) FF analysis are reported in Table
1. When reading the table it is important to bear in mind that smaller probabilities
suggest more variability. In general, they show that the adoption of IT meant
greater exchange rate ﬂexibility, translated into higher probabilities of exchange
rate changes that exceed the ± 2.5% range. The results are rather impressive, with
the exception of Mexico. In the case of Brazil, before IT the exchange rate moved
within the bounds 92% of the time; after, exchange rate changes were conﬁned
within the bounds only 48% of the time. For South Korea, the exchange rate was
conﬁned within the bounds 93% of the time before IT, and 78% after. Regarding the
monetary policy instruments, we observe less variability of both nominal interest
rates and international reserves for all the economies in the sample. This is more
evident across the range for interest rates, which may be indicating a move towards
greater use of interest rate smoothing policies common in IT regimes. 7
Table 1
FF analysis: Calvo and Reinhart’s (2002) methodology
Before IT After IT
△e △i △R △e △i △R
Brazil 92% 23% 43% 48% 68% 48%
Mexico 83% 17% 29% 83% 46% 75%
South Korea 93% 38% 51% 78% 89% 67%
Note: The numbers are the probabilities of changes
conﬁned within the bounds presented in equations
(1) to (3).
Table 2 shows the results for Ball and Reyes’ (2008) FF analysis. As discussed in
the previous subsection, the results show the probability of having a monthly change
of each variable that is greater than its standard deviation. In other words, larger
probabilities suggest more variability. If the analysed countries have truthfully
adopted IT we expect to see more variability of the exchange rate, and less
variability of inﬂation and policy instruments (real interest rates and international
reserves).
The conclusions are similar to those found using Calvo and Reinhart’s (2002)
approach. The results show a strong movement towards a freer exchange rate, with
much more volatility after IT. For Brazil the probability of the exchange rate
moving by more than one standard deviation in a given month increased from just
7% to 30% after IT; for Mexico it increased from 10% to 33%; and for South
7 Sack and Wieland (2000, p. 205) deﬁne interest rate smoothing as the tendency of Central Banks
to change interest rates “in sequences of small steps in the same direction and reverse the direction
of interest rate movements only infrequently”. The main reason for this type of behaviour is to avoid
unnecessary economic instability brought about by large swings in interest rates.
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Korea from 5% to 29%. Inﬂation, on the other hand, becomes less volatile only
for South Korea. Monetary policy instruments, however, do not appear to show
a clear pattern, which makes it diﬃcult to ﬁnd a correct classiﬁcation for each
country according to the metric applied. Although for most of the economies greater
exchange rate ﬂexibility is seen after IT, more variability of interest rates and
international reserves is also observed in some cases. For Brazil the international
reserves seem to be more volatile after IT, but real rates seem to be less. The
same applies to South Korea. In the case of Mexico both policy instruments have
a higher variability after IT.
Table 2
FF analysis: Ball and Reyes’ (2008) methodology
Before IT After IT
△e △R △P △r △e △R △P △r
Brazil 7% 13% 46% 20% 30% 23% 59% 18%
Mexico 10% 13% 48% 14% 33% 20% 61% 24%
South Korea 5% 21% 45% 26% 29% 33% 37% 23%
Note: The numbers are the probabilities of changes that exceed
the bounds presented in equations (4) to (7).
We can get two conclusions from this initial exercise:
(i) the exchange rate has been freer after IT; and
(ii) some interventions in the foreign exchange market still seem to occur, which
may, or may not, be a symptom of FF.
In the next section we will further investigate this last point, as we assess the policy
response to nominal shocks within a VAR framework, which enables feedback eﬀects
between the variables to be accounted for.
3. IT and FF Practices
Some previous studies have tried to analyse interventions in the exchange rate in
an IT regime looking at impulse responses. For example, Reyes (2003) used a VAR
model of interest rates, international reserves and exchange rates to analyse the
FF hypothesis for Brazil, Mexico and Chile, and showed that both interest rates
and international reserves react to exchange rate shocks in all three countries. Ball
and Reyes (2004) also used a VAR model to check for policy responses to exchange
rate movements in Mexico, and showed that the monetary policy was very reactive
to exchange rate shocks. Park (2001) used a VAR for South Korea, and concluded
that the country was clearly pursuing FF practices, as policy instruments reacted
strongly to exchange rate changes.
The main advantage of using a VAR model over the results presented in the
previous section is that it allows conditioning on the behaviour of all the variables
of the system. In this sense, we use data on import prices (P∗), nominal exchange
EconomiA, Bras´ ılia(DF), v.10, n.2, p.195–209, May-Aug 2009 201Reginaldo Pinto Nogueira J´ unior
rates (e), international reserves (R), nominal interest rates (i), real output (y)
and consumer prices (P) in order to check the responsiveness of interest rates and
international reserves to diﬀerent shocks. Our analysis is complementary to the
studies cited above because we compare the results prior and after the adoption of
IT, thus investigating the role of the regime change. Moreover, we worry not only
about the reaction of monetary policy to exchange rate shocks, but also to inﬂation
shocks.
We use generalized impulse responses, as described by Pesaran and Shin (1998).
This methodology constructs an orthogonal set of innovations that, unlike Choleski
decompositions of the covariance matrix, does not depend on the VAR ordering,
thus presenting more robust results. The number of lags of the VAR models was
determined using the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). The results are shown
in Table 3.
Table 3
Lag length selection (SIC)
Mexico South Korea Brazil
Lags Before IT After IT Before IT After IT Before IT After IT
0 29.37941 21.31693 28.68440 24.86988 36.17971 31.02148
1 26.98206* 18.67945* 28.57934* 24.55362* 34.75313* 28.48107*
2 27.35782 19.86382 29.62233 25.28325 36.31639 28.79907
3 28.22268 21.10311 30.71940 26.14722 38.12935 29.94539
4 29.57385 22.28483 31.65388 27.16594 39.37961 30.88787
3.1. Data
As in the previous section, we use monthly data from 1995M1 to 2005M12 for
Brazil, and 1991M1 to 2005M12 for Mexico and Korea, with the same sample
breaks. As before, data was obtained from the IMF’s IFS database; the price
variable is the consumer price index; nominal exchange rate is the national currency
per unit of dollar; international reserves data is the foreign exchange reserves; and
nominal interest rates are the money market rates. In addition, we use the industrial
production index as a proxy of real output, as monthly GDP data was not available.
Finally, import prices are the index of dollar price of imports. This data was not
available for Mexico, so as a proxy of foreign costs faced by this country we used
the U.S. producer price index.
Some standard ADF unit root tests were applied to the data collected, and most
variables are best described as non-stationary. The exceptions are interest rates
for Brazil and Mexico, and import prices for Brazil. Therefore, for these countries
these variables were modelled in levels, while all the other variables were used in
ﬁrst-diﬀerences.
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Table 4
ADF unit root tests
Mexico South Korea Brazil
e (0) -1.236 (2) -1.801 (1) -1.420
△e (0) -10.25** (1) -9.319** (1) -7.871**
i (1) -3.208** (1) -1.926 (1) -2.749*
△i - (0) -10.30** -
P (1) -0.220 (3) -1.069 (1) 0.331
△P (0) -3.901** (2) -9.062** (0) -4.537**
R (0) 0.917 (1) 2.913 (0) -1.993
△R (0) -16.21** (0) -9.164** (0) -10.57**
P
∗ (2) 2.706 (1) -1.699 (1) -4.804**
△P
∗ (0) -11.08** (0) -9.324** -
y (2) -0.687 (1) 1.536 (0) -0.441
△y (1) -8.973** (1) -8.614** (0) -13.62**
Notes: The numbers are the test statistic of ADF unit root tests under the null of non-stationarity. Numbers in
parentheses are the number of lags, as deﬁned using the Schwarz Information Criterion. * indicates the rejection
of the null at the 10% conﬁdence level. ** indicates rejection of the null at the 5% conﬁdence level. The symbol
△ indicates ﬁrst-diﬀerences.
3.2. Results
The VAR estimations results are presented here using impulse response functions,
following one standard error shock to inﬂation and to the exchange rate, both before
and after IT. As the standard errors are diﬀerent for each period, it is important
to bear in mind diﬀerences in the shocks. These are reported in Table 5. 8 We also
present bootstrapped conﬁdence bands for the impulse responses.
While observing the impulse responses it is important to note some basic aspects:
the sign and size of the eﬀect, its signiﬁcance and its persistence. The expected
movement of the variables following an exchange rate or an inﬂation shock is a
positive change in nominal interest rates, and a negative change in reserves. As
mentioned before our main argument is that some exchange rate smoothing may
be accepted under IT; nonetheless, Central Banks should not move the exchange
8 Higher standard errors for the exchange rate before IT are not a sign of a freer exchange rate regime;
it is only capturing the eﬀect of the large swings in exchange rates brought about by the currency crises
that, ultimately, led to IT and a ﬂoating system. It is worth-noting that this result is consistent with
Ag´ enor’s (2002) argument that by enhancing macroeconomic stability, an IT regime may provide more
stability to a ﬂexible exchange rate than a pegged arrangement that is subject to recurrent speculative
pressures (and possibly forced devaluations) due to perceived inconsistencies in macroeconomic policies.
In this sense, the methodologies of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Ball and Reyes (2008) applied in the
previous section are a much better way of observing exchange rate ﬂexibility.
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rate to artiﬁcial levels. In this sense we should observe, after IT, a stronger response
to inﬂation than to exchange rate shocks, although some response to exchange rate
is still acceptable.
Table 5
Shock deﬁnitions (Sd. Errors)
Ex. Rate Inﬂation
Mexico before IT 5.246 1.198
Mexico after IT 1.711 0.405
Korea before IT 5.324 0.524
Korea after IT 2.245 0. 441
Brazil before IT 5.284 0.700
Brazil after IT 4.133 0.508
Firstly, the results show that before IT both policy instruments (reserves and
interest rates) responded strongly to exchange rate changes in all countries, whereas
the inﬂation response was weak and generally not signiﬁcant, with the exception
of Mexico. In particular, reserves seemed to respond strongly (and signiﬁcantly) to
exchange rate shocks across countries, in a clear direct intervention stance. This is
consistent with a framework that worries more about the exchange rate than about
inﬂation, thus indicating that these countries were indeed pegging the exchange
rate.
After the adoption of IT some response to exchange rate shocks is still observed
for all three countries, but in general it is milder than before. The only clear
exception is Mexico’s interest rates response, which is basically the same in both
periods (adjusting for diﬀerences in shocks); nonetheless, there are no more signs
of international reserves response to exchange rate shocks for this country after
IT. Regarding South Korea, we found signs of international reserves response
to exchange rate shocks after IT, but milder than before the regime change.
Furthermore, the interest rates response to exchange rate shocks for this country
has become much weaker and not signiﬁcant. Finally, for Brazil we observe,
after IT, no sign of international reserves use to ﬁght exchange rate movements.
Moreover, we note only a weak response of interest rates to exchange rate shocks,
which is not statistically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding reduces considerably the strength
of the FF critique for Brazil.
Turning our attention now to the instruments’ response to inﬂation shocks
after IT, we observe that the response of interest rates has become stronger and
more persistent across countries. This ﬁnding indicates that, as expected, all three
Central Banks seem to have changed their approach towards inﬂation, becoming
more aggressive especially in their interest rates decisions. This is particularly
noticeable for Brazil. Regarding Mexico, we acknowledge that the interest rates
response is only slightly signiﬁcant; however, it is highly persistent. Finally, it is
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Fig. 2. Mexico after IT
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Fig. 4. Brazil after IT
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Fig. 6. South Korea after IT
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worth noting that for South Korea there are also signs of international reserves
response to inﬂation shocks after IT, reinforcing the view of “fear of inﬂation”.
As observed by Ball and Reyes (2004) it is very diﬃcult to determine whether a
country is pursuing a strict IT regime or is actually practising FF. As discussed
before, the risk of misclassifying a country’s policy is that it may put in question the
real intentions of the Central Bank, and thus undermine its credibility. However,
our intention here is not classifying the countries but rather analyzing changes in
monetary policy reaction after the adoption of IT. In this sense our results show
that the adoption of IT was in fact followed by an actual shift in monetary policy
behaviour that in general became more worried about inﬂation than about the
exchange rate.
4. Conclusion
We have presented evidence on the monetary policy reaction to exchange rate
and inﬂation shocks for three emerging countries. In contrast to previous studies, we
use this evidence to address if there has been a change in monetary policy after the
adoption of Inﬂation Targeting (IT). We ask if this new regime meant a movement
towards greater exchange rate ﬂexibility, and to what extent the intervention of
the Central Bank presents features of ‘”Fear of Floating” or simply reﬂects “Fear
of Inﬂation”.
Our results allow us to draw three main conclusions. First, exchange rate
variability has generally increased after IT. Second, although some Central Banks
kept on reacting to exchange rate shocks, the interventions in the foreign exchange
market have decreased. This intervention has also become more indirect through the
use of interest rates, which suggests the use of policy rules common in IT regimes.
Third, the monetary policy response to inﬂation shocks has become stronger and
more persistent after IT, suggesting the prevalence of “Fear of Inﬂation” over “Fear
of Floating”.
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